Larry Kushner v. Attorney General New Jersey by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-22-2018 
Larry Kushner v. Attorney General New Jersey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"Larry Kushner v. Attorney General New Jersey" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 384. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/384 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2761 
_____________ 
  
LARRY J. KUSHNER, 
  Appellant 
     
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY;  
NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD 
   
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-14-cv-03709) 
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
______________ 
 
Argued: May 1, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 22, 2018) 
 
Adrienne Box, Student Counsel  [ARGUED] 
Matthew Goddard, Student Counsel  [ARGUED]   
Adrian N. Roe, Esq. 
Duquesne University School of Law 
Tribone Center for Clinical Legal Education 
914 Fifth Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 Counsel for Appellant  
 
Ian D. Brater, Esq.  [ARGUED] 
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Esq. 
2 
 
Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office 
132 Jerseyville Avenue 
Freehold, NJ 07728 
 Counsel for Appellee 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Larry Kushner filed this habeas corpus petition challenging his New 
Jersey conviction under the speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.  The District 
Court denied the petition.  We will affirm.   
I 
 In 2010, Kushner pled guilty to theft by deception, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-4, and 
failure to file a state tax return, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:52-8.  He was sentenced to seven 
years’ incarceration and $1,122,200 in restitution.  We recount the procedural history of 
his case only as is necessary for this appeal.   
 On February 8, 2007, Kushner was arrested on charges of credit card fraud and 
identity theft.  Within days, he was released on bail.  On May 12, 2008—approximately 
fifteen months later—the state indicted Kushner on twenty-six counts of theft by 
deception, credit card fraud, identity theft, and failure to file New Jersey tax returns. 
 On September 14, 2010, Kushner pled guilty, reserving his right to raise a speedy 
trial claim.  The trial court subsequently denied his speedy trial motion.  Among other 
                                              
 *  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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things, the trial court found that the state’s delay in indicting Kushner resulted from the 
complex nature of the case, which involved over four thousand pages of discovery, 
multiple corporations and properties, and investigation in three states.  The Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed.  State v. Kushner, No. 08-05-1175, 
2012 WL 5990107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 3, 2012) (per curiam).  It found that 
Kushner’s speedy trial rights were not violated under the balancing test set forth in 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).  The New Jersey Supreme Court denied 
review. 
 This habeas corpus petition followed.  Kushner now asserts that his speedy trial 
rights were violated by the fifteen month delay between his arrest and indictment.1  The 
District Court denied relief, finding that Kushner could not overcome the standard of 
review of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  The District Court granted a certificate of appealability because 
reasonable jurists could disagree.2  See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017). 
II3 
 AEDPA limits the ability of a federal court to grant habeas corpus relief to a 
petitioner based upon a federal constitutional claim where, as here, that claim was 
                                              
 1  There was also post-indictment delay, but Kushner does not challenge it on 
appeal. 
 
 2  We thank the Duquesne University School of Law Tribone Center for Clinical 
Legal Education for their zealous pro bono advocacy on appeal.   
 
 3  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Our review of the District Court’s 
decision is plenary.  Dennis v. Secretary, 834 F.3d 263, 280 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
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“adjudicated on the merits” in state court.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  Under Section 2254(d), 
habeas relief shall not be granted unless the adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Under Section 
2254(d)(1), a state court decision involves an unreasonable application “if the court 
identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme Court’s cases but 
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.”  McKernan v. Superintendent, 
849 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  A state court’s 
findings of fact are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to rebut them.  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).   
III 
 The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.’”  U.S. Const. amend VI.  This provision is 
binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Barker, 407 U.S. at 515.  
When assessing a constitutional speedy trial claim, among the factors we consider are the 
“[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and 
prejudice to the defendant.”  Id. at 530.  Kushner argues that the state court unreasonably 
applied the Barker factors.  We cannot agree.   
 The first factor, the length of the delay, “trigger[s]” the speedy trial analysis.  
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  In 
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Kushner’s case, the parties agree that a fifteen month delay is sufficient to trigger the 
analysis.  Accordingly, a court must consider the length of the delay among the other 
Barker factors.  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652.  The state court reasonably did so.  It found 
that “for a complex case such as this” the delay was not “overly long.”  App. 138.  This 
was not an unreasonable application of Barker, which provides that “the delay that can be 
tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex 
conspiracy charge.”  Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.   
 As to the second factor, the reason for the delay, Kushner argues that the state 
court unreasonably emphasized that the state’s delay was unintentional.  This was a 
reasonable application of Barker, which provides that “different weights should be 
assigned to different reasons” with “more neutral reason[s] such as negligence or 
overcrowded courts . . . weigh[ing] less heavily” than deliberate attempts to delay.  Id.; 
see also Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009); Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657. 
 As to the third factor, the assertion of the right, Kushner argues that the state court 
unreasonably highlighted the fact that he did not assert a speedy trial claim pre-
indictment.  See N.J. Ct. R. 3:25-3 (providing for such a motion).  This is an accurate 
reading of the state court opinion.  But while reasonable jurists could disagree as to the 
state court’s analysis of this factor, we cannot conclude that the Barker analysis was 
objectively unreasonable.  See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (requiring a court to consider both 
“[w]hether and how” the defendant asserted the speedy trial right); see also id. at 533 
(holding that “none of the four factors . . . [is] necessary or sufficient”). 
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 As to the fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant, Kushner argues that the state 
court unreasonably focused on the fact that he was released on bail.  Kushner argues that, 
while not incarcerated, he still suffered anxiety, travel restrictions, and financial hardship 
impacting his ability to hire private counsel.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 (recognizing 
multiple forms of prejudice); Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (same).  We conclude that the state 
court’s prejudice analysis was not unreasonable.  The state court recognized that 
prejudice includes not only incarceration, but also “anxiety and concern of the accused, 
and impairment of the defense.”  App. 137 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Moreover, it never held that Kushner was not prejudiced—only that he did not suffer 
prejudice of a constitutional magnitude. 
 We recognize that Kushner, and the District Court, appropriately highlighted some 
of the weaker aspects of the state court’s opinion.  Yet we cannot hold that the state 
court’s application of the Barker factors was “objectively unreasonable,” and so, we will 
affirm.  McKernan, 849 F.3d at 563 (citation omitted).   
IV 
 The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
